Political Economy and Public Policy Series
"The World Bank and Democratic Accountability"
Thurs., Dec. 6 at 3:30 pm
M 3-415 (PPOL classroom)
Prof. Ramon Borges-Mendez has organized this series as a complement to our coursework. Join us for an interactive graduate-level discussion and an opportunity to flex your intellectual muscles! Consider our invited guest as a potential dissertation committee member. Light refreshments will be served.
You can read the paper ahead of time here:
Ebrahim, A. and S. Herz (2007). "Accountability in Complex Organizations: World Bank Responses to Civil Society," Harvard Business School Working Paper #08-027, available at: http://www.hbs.edu/research/facpubs/workingpapers/papers0708.html#wp08-027
Abstract for Presentation
Civil society actors have been pushing for greater accountability in the World Bank for at least three decades. This paper outlines the range of accountability mechanisms currently in place at the World Bank and organizes them into four “regimes”: (1) a technocratic regime at the staff level, (2) a compliance regime at the project level, (3) a consultative regime at the global policy level, and (4) a global capital regime at the level of board governance. The first half of this paper introduces the four regime types and gaps of accountability in each. We argue that civil society organizations have been influential in pushing for greater accountability at the project level through compliance-oriented policies such as social and environmental safeguards and complaint and response mechanisms (i.e., the consultative and compliance regimes). But they have been much less successful in increasing accountability at the staff and board governance levels (i.e., the technocratic and global capital regimes). In other words, although civil society efforts have led to some gains in accountability with respect to Bank policies and projects, the deeper structural features of the institution — how staff are promoted and how it is governed — remain unchanged.
